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Abstract 
It is known that on average people adapt their choice of memory strategy to the 
subjective utility of interaction. What is not known is whether individual choices are 
boundedly optimal. Two experiments are reported that test the hypothesis that 
individual decisions about the distribution of remembering between internal and 
external resources are boundedly optimal where optimality is defined relative to 
experience, cognitive constraints, and reward. The theory makes predictions that are 
tested against the data, not fitted to it. The experiments use a no-choice/choice utility 
learning paradigm where the no-choice phase is used to elicit a profile of each 
participant’s performance across the strategy space and the choice phase is used to 
test predicted choices within this space. They show that the majority of individuals 
select strategies that are boundedly optimal. Further, individual differences in what 
people choose to do are successfully predicted by the analysis. Two issues are 
discussed: (1) the performance of the minority of participants who did not find 
boundedly optimal adaptations, and (2) the possibility that individuals anticipate what, 
with practice, will become a bounded optimal strategy, rather, than what is boundedly 
optimal during training. 
 
Keywords: Bounded optimality, adaptation, bounded rationality, constraints, utility 
maximisation. 
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It is known that people choose strategies that adaptively distribute memory and 
planning between internal and external resources according to the cost/benefit 
structure of the task environment (Payne, Howes & Reader, 2001; Gray, Sims, Fu, 
Schoelles, 2006; Marewski & Schooler, 2011).  For example, it is known that lower 
action costs when solving the 8-puzzle decreased the amount of planning by 
participants (O’Hara and Payne, 1998). This can lead to longer solution paths and less 
learning in terms of transfer to other solution paths. Similarly, it is known that people 
make strategic use of computer help systems when the costs of accessing such 
systems are low but otherwise prefer strategies that rely on imperfect memory (Gray 
and Fu, 2004). Gray et al. refer to people as preferring imperfect information in the 
head over perfect information in the world. Many others have demonstrated, or argued 
for, the adaptive nature of how people use the external task environment (Brumby, 
Howes & Salvucci, 2007; Cary & Carlson, 2001; Charman & Howes, 2003; Duggan 
& Payne, 2001; Edwards, 1965; Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Gigerenzer, Todd & the 
ABC Group, 1999; Gray, Sims, Fu & Schoelles, 2006; Kirsh & Maglio, 1994; Payne, 
Bettman & Johnson, 1993; Payne, Duggan & Neth, 2007; Payne, Richardson & 
Howes, 2001; Schönpflug, 1986; Smith, Lewis, Howes, Chu, & Green, 2008; Tseng 
& Howes, 2008; Walsh & Anderson, 2009).  
The proposal that people distribute memory adaptively contrasts to the idea 
that people routinely offload cognitive processing (Hollan, Hutchins, & Kirsch, 
2000). A weak version of the offloading hypothesis is that people simply make use of 
the environment to perform cognitive functions. The stronger version is that people 
favor the use of the environment over the use of internal psychological resources. 
Ballard, Hayhoe, Pook, and Rao (1997), for example, argued that people use a 
minimal memory strategy to copy arrangements of color blocks on a computer 
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display. Participants in an experimental study tended to make frequent visual checks 
of the target pattern, rather than attempting to encode the pattern in memory. The idea 
that people favor offloading was rejected by S. J. Payne et al. (2001) in favor of a 
view of people as adaptive decision makers (J. W. Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1993). 
The idea that people make use of the environment was not disputed, but rather Payne 
et al. (2001) questioned the idea that people minimize the use of internal cognitive 
resources, or that they are cognitively lazy. According to Payne et al. (2001), people 
choose to trade offloading with cognitive processing given the cost/benefit structure 
of the task.  According to Gray et al. (2006), differences in temporal cost of just a few 
hundreds of milliseconds are enough to shift the allocation of resources from relying 
on the environment to more memory intensive strategies. 
The purpose of the current article is to test whether an individual’s selection of 
strategies for short-term remembering can be explained as boundedly optimal 
remembering. Behaviour is boundedly optimal if it can be predicted with a theory in 
which subjective utility is maximised given the bounds imposed by individual 
information processing capacities and their experience (Howes, Lewis & Vera, 2009; 
Howes, Lewis & Singh, 2014; Howes, Vera, Lewis & McCurdy, 2004; Lewis, Howes 
& Singh, 2014: Lewis, Vera & Howes, 2004). The hypothesis moves beyond previous 
work on adaptation to consider the cost/benefit structure of the task environment in 
two respects. The first, is in the assumption that people do not merely adapt the 
distribution of memory but that they can also find boundedly optimal adaptations. The 
second, is in the assumption that the bounds are not only those of the task 
environment but that they are also due to an individual’s own particular resource 
limits and experience. 
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The particular resource limits that we focus on in this article are memory 
limits. We are interested in the extent to which people are boundedly optimal given 
experience of their own performance on a simple short-term remembering task. 
Previous work, concerning what people choose to remember, has been conducted by 
Ballard, Hayhoe and Pelz (1995) and by Gray et al. (2006), amongst others. 
Following Ballard et al. (1995), Gray et al. (2006) used a Blocks World task to study 
the choices that people make about what to remember. The participant’s task was to 
reproduce patterns of coloured squares (blocks) visible in a Target window, in a 
Workspace window. There might, for example, be 8 blocks, each of a different color, 
positioned randomly in a 4 x 4 grid. Gray et al. manipulated a lockout period, a period 
of 0 to 3000 milliseconds, before the target pattern became available after the 
participant moved the mouse over it. On average blocks encoded in memory per visit 
to the Target window increased from just over 2 to just under 3 blocks as the lockout 
period increased, demonstrating adaptation to external costs. The studies reported 
below use a variant of Gray et al.’s task to show that choice about how much to 
encode is not only adaptive but that it is also boundedly optimal. 
Bounded Optimality 
The motivations for this paper come from the bounded optimality framework 
proposed in Howes, Lewis and McCurdy (2004), Howes, Lewis and Vera (2009), 
Payne and Howes (2013) and Lewis, Howes and Singh (2014).  The term “bounded 
optimality” was first used to refer to algorithms that maximize utility given a set of 
assumptions about problems and constraints in machine reasoning problems (Horvitz, 
1988). According to Russell and Subramanian (1995), page 575: “an agent is 
boundedly optimal if its program is a solution to the constrained optimization problem 
presented by its architecture and the task environment.” We assume here that 
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individual, embodied, human minds correspond to the kinds of boundedly optimal 
machines defined by Russell and Subramanian (1995) although we do not, for the 
moment, make the distinctions between the different types of bounded optimality 
articulated by these authors. Unlike, Russell and Subramanian (1995) our goal is not 
to develop the formal basis of Artificial Intelligence, but rather to test bounded 
optimality as a hypothesis about human behaviour. The key element that Russell and 
Subramanian (1995) bring is that rational behaviour is usefully defined as the 
deployment of optimal programs relative to constraints that include the cognitive 
architecture and experience (Lewis, Howes & Singh, 2014).  In contrast, other 
approaches, more strongly influenced by economics, have tended to define rationality 
relative to the task environment (Anderson & Schooler, 1991) and/or in terms of 
sound principles of inference (Oaksford & Chater, 2007), though see Schooler and 
Anderson (1997) for a discussion of the relationship between rational analysis and 
processing bounds. 
Bounded optimality is also influenced by key concepts in Reinforcement 
Learning (RL: Sutton & Barto, 1998; Dayan & Daw, 2008). Most importantly, 
Reinforcement Learning makes a commitment to the idea that learning what to do 
next concerns learning to maximise numerical reward signals through interaction with 
the environment. RL suggests extending Cognitive Science’s traditional focus on 
goal-directed behaviour to a more explicit consideration of the utility of costs and 
benefits of interaction. Rather than merely describing goal states, RL demands that the 
value of states are considered with the aim of maximising the utility of behaviour to 
the agent. Our interest, therefore, is not with RL methods as hypotheses about the 
nature of human learning (e.g., Dayan & Daw, 2008), nor with RL methods as means 
of calculating optimal solutions (Chater, 2009), but rather with the formal definition 
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of the RL problem as bounded utility maximisation. By implication, the problem of 
how to distribute memory is the problem of how to maximise reward signals through 
interaction with the environment. 
In the following section, we report a number of examples of evidence for 
boundedly optimal behaviour. After that we contrast the optimization assumption 
required by bounded optimality with the explicit rejection of optimality found in 
Bounded Rationality (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Simon, 1992). 
Evidence for Bounded Optimality Given Response Variance 
There is no empirical work to our knowledge that directly tests whether people 
are able to choose short-term memory strategies that are boundedly optimal. 
However, there is relevant evidence in a range of perceptual-motor tasks. While these 
tasks do not demand that participants adapt what they choose to remember they do 
demand that people adapt movement strategies. A brief review is useful here because 
it will support a clearer articulation of the hypothesis. In particular, it will help us 
develop a theory of how the selection of remembering strategies is bounded by 
variation in how an individual performs a task, where variation is an inevitable 
consequence of internal constraints. 
For example, Meyer, Abrams, Kornblum, Wright and Smith (1988), showed 
how a stochastic optimized-submovement model can explain simple movements. In 
the model, movements are described as an optimal compromise between the durations 
of primary and secondary submovements given noise on the control of movement 
caused by limitations of internal information processing and muscular control 
processes. The secondary movement acts to correct unintended, but inevitable, 
variance in the primary movement. Optimization is therefore bounded by internally 
generated variation in performance. 
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 In an empirical investigation of Signal Detection Theory, Swets, Tanner and 
Birdsall (1961) tested the hypothesis that people select a boundedly optimal criterion. 
Participants were shown to select criterion levels, for the trade-off between correct 
detection and false alarms, that maximised utility. The optimization was achieved 
accounting for noise generated by the perceptual system in the signal level of targets 
and distractors. As with Meyer et al. (1988), people are boundedly optimal in the 
sense that they generate strategies that are optimal given bounds imposed by variation 
in human information processing mechanisms. 
Trommershäuser, Maloney and Landy  (2003)  demonstrated that the 
assumption that participants were able to maximise financial gain in a task where they 
used a finger to point at a reward region and avoid a penalty region could be used to 
predict targeting. As with the previous examples, participants in this study learned to 
adjust where they pointed to their own particular profile of motor system noise. 
Participants who exhibited greater variation in the spread of where they pointed 
needed to adjust more in order to avoid the penalty region. Further studies have 
supported the idea that people learn boundedly optimal pointing strategies given 
variation in performance (Maloney & Mamassian, 2009; Trommershäuser, Maloney 
& Landy, 2003; Trommershäuser, Maloney & Landy, 2008). 
Bounded optimality is also evident in more complex situations that require 
two responses and require those responses to be ordered (Howes, Lewis & Vera, 
2009). By assuming that people were boundedly optimal in a series of Psychological 
Refractory Period (PRP) experiments, Howes et al. demonstrated that the interval 
between two responses could be precisely predicted for individual participants. 
Critically, the analysis defined optimality relative to the variance in the duration of 
each of the two responses. In order to maximise the utility of performance the model 
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set the inter-response interval to a duration that was long enough to minimize the 
potential for response reversals without incurring a penalty for an excessive delay in 
the timing of the second response. The shorter the inter-response interval the greater 
the probability of a reversal error because of the variation in the duration of both 
responses. In other words, while participants cannot precisely predict the duration of 
one particular response, they can adjust performance to the response distributions. 
Howes et al.’s analysis of the PRP data showed that participants had made boundedly 
optimal adjustments to the duration between the two responses given individual 
characteristics of the response distributions. 
Bounded optimality Versus bounded rationality 
Bounded optimality shares much in common with bounded rationality. 
Bounded rationality is a framework for understanding behaviour that starts with the 
observation that people have limited time and limited capacities (Simon, 1997). These 
bounds impose limits on the extent to which people approximate the classical 
normative rationality that is, in contrast, insensitive to the reality of computation in 
the world. Bounded rationality also makes a commitment to the observation that 
behaviour often reflects adaptation to the structure of the environment (Gigerenzer, et 
al. 1999; Oaksford and Chater, 1994; Simon, 1997).  In these respects, there is no 
difference between bounded optimality and bounded rationality. 
Where Bounded optimality and bounded rationality differ is in the explicit 
rejection of optimality criteria that is evident in the definitions of bounded rationality 
provided by Simon (1997) and Gigerenzer and Selten (2001).  While in earlier work, 
Simon pursued the idea that satisficing, a Bounded Rational heuristic method, was 
optimal for certain tasks (Kadane & Simon, 1977; Simon, 1955; Simon & Kadane, 
1975), the predominant position articulated in his work was that the environment is 
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too complex and computational resources are too limited for optimization to play a 
role in explaining human behaviour (Simon, 1997). Gigerenzer, Todd and the ABC 
Research Group (1999) embraced this view of bounded rationality. Gigerenzer et al. 
work with the premise that much of human decision making and reasoning can be 
modelled with heuristics that “do not compute probabilities or utilities”. For 
Gigerenzer et al. the notion that people might optimize under constraints is a 
“demon”, a creature with unlimited capacity, that is rejected along with the 
“Unbounded Rationality demon” (pages 10-11; Gigerenzer et al., 1999). From 
Gigerenzer’s perspective optimization under constraints is paradoxical in that it seeks 
to explain limited information processing by assuming that the mind has essentially 
“unlimited time and knowledge”.   
Bounded rationality and bounded optimality also differ sharply in practice. For 
example, Simon’s contributions to understanding short-term memory, long- term 
associative memory, and problem representations (e.g., see the compilations in 
Simon, 1979, 1989) were made without benefit of an explicit consideration of the 
effects of the utility functions that human participants might have adopted in the 
experimental situations. In contrast, bounded optimality requires consideration of 
utility functions (Howes, Lewis and Vera, 2009; Lewis, Howes and Singh, 2014).  
However, our contention here is that in a wider range of tasks than previously 
thought, optimization algorithms can be usefully used to predict human behaviour. 
This is for three reasons. The first reason is the substantial recent literature, some of 
which is reviewed above showing that optimization can play a useful role in 
psychological theorising.  The extensive repetition of more-or-less similar tasks, for 
example, gives opportunity, both in terms of time and knowledge, for optimal 
adaptation to occur on perceptual-motor tasks (see above) it may also do so on more 
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complex, higher level decision making tasks, that involve constraints imposed by 
memory. The second reason is that these tasks, including many tasks used in 
experimental psychology, are what Savage (1954) called ‘small world’ tasks and it is 
therefore possible for the researcher to ascertain and solve the decision problem faced 
by the participants.  
The third reason is that, in contrast to optimization under constraints, the cost 
of optimization is paid by the analyst, not by the participant. Bounded optimality does 
not assume that the mind is unlimited, rather it asserts that the analyst can usefully 
make use of optimization to test theories of the bounds (Lewis, Howes & Singh, 
2014). This assumption is what Oaksford and Chater (1994) called ‘methodological 
optimality’. A key benefit is that a prediction derived through optimization has a 
privileged status as an explanation for why people behave as they do because it allows 
a causal link to be established between bounds and behaviour (Hahn, 2014; Howes, 
Lewis & Vera, 2009; Payne & Howes, 2013). 
 
Bounded optimality and probability matching  
In contrast to the evidence, provided above, in favour of bounded optimality 
given response variance there are many studies that show that people probability 
match (Vulkan, 2002). Probability matching occurs when the frequency with which a 
choice is made is proportional to the probability that the choice maximizes subjective 
utility. Probability matching is often taken as evidence against the idea that people can 
be explained as performance optimisers. For a review of the probability matching 
literature see Vulkan (2000). While some studies have questioned the assertion that 
people probability match (e.g. Shanks et al., 2002), probability matching phenomena 
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have been offered by others as evidence that people do not maximize subjective 
utility.  
It is arguable whether people should probability match when they first 
experience a choice task. Indeed the boundedly optimal strategy for early stages of 
learning given choices with uncertain outcomes can be extremely difficult to 
ascertain. In general, the solution to these problems, depending on the assumptions, 
involves a period of exploration followed by convergence to the policy that exploits 
the highest rates of reward (Sutton & Barto, 1998; Gittins, 1989). In this paper we are 
interested in the bounded optimality of the strategies on which people converge after a 
period of exploration. In the studies, reported below we not only test whether 
participants are boundedly optimal but also whether they probability match. We ask 
which of these two theories is better able to explain the data. 
 
Overview 
If individuals are boundedly optimal then they should seek strategies that are 
optimal given subjective utility and bounds on short-term remembering. Each 
individual should not offload and should not make a minimal use of memory. They 
should not exhibit any bias in the use of memory away from what is measurably 
boundedly optimal for that individual. They should not continue to probability match 
in cases where the prediction of maximized utility deviates from the prediction of 
probability matching. 
In what follows, we report two experiments. In each experiment, participants 
are asked to make choices that have implications for the remembering strategies that 
can be deployed while performing a laboratory version of an everyday task. The 
choices concern how many items to hold in memory when copying messages from a 
Boundedly Optimal Short-Term Remembering 
 13 
calendar to an email system. Structurally, the task is similar to that deployed by Gray 
et al. (2006) which involved copying colour squares but, in contrast, to Gray et al. it 
uses a no-choice/choice paradigm so as to measure the utility of a range of different 
memory loads for each participant. Therefore, unlike for Gray et al. it is possible to 
draw conclusions about the efficiency of a participant’s choice of memory load. The 
paradigm is described further in the next section.  
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 was designed to test whether individuals used a boundedly 
optimal distribution of memory in a laboratory version of a memory task. The task 
involved copying appointments from a simulated ‘email’ application to a simulated 
‘calendar’ application. Trials of the experiment were organised into a no-choice phase 
and a choice phase. This design is a novel variant on the choice/no-choice paradigm 
employed by Siegler and Lemaire (1997). In a no-choice/choice paradigm participants 
are first told which strategy to practice (a no-choice phase) and then asked to choose 
their preferred strategy (a choice phase). Siegler and Lemaire (1997) introduced the 
choice/no-choice paradigm, with the choice phase first, so as to address weaknesses 
with choice studies of adaptation.  With the no-choice phase they were interested in 
obtaining unbiased estimates of the performance characteristics of a set of strategies, 
and in particular in recording the speed and accuracy of each strategy.  
We reversed Siegler and Lemaire’s (1997) choice/no-choice order so that the 
no-choice phase could act as a training phase ensuring that all participants were 
equally exposed to every strategy. This provided performance data that could be used 
to inform and evaluate strategy selection during the choice phase.  
The purpose of the no-choice phase was to elicit a performance profile of a 
subset of the memory strategies available to participants. The space of strategies for 
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the email-copying task encompasses variation along a number of dimensions, 
including number of items to encode, encoding method, and rehearsal method. 
However, rather than explicitly elaborate a large space of strategies varying along 
these dimensions and instructing participants on the micro-structure of each strategy 
within this space, we presented participants with a sequence of trials that varied in the 
number of items that the participant was asked to remember. We used a small space of 
possible list lengths (3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9) and instructed participants to attempt to 
remember the corresponding numbers of names. For example, a participant might be 
asked to remember 5 names and copy these to the ‘calendar’. In addition, the 
incremental presentation of the list of appointments further restricted the encoding 
strategy. These list lengths and instructions, thereby, encouraged participants to adopt 
a strategy that involved the encoding of a certain number of appointments in memory. 
The participants’ performance on each list length provides us with a measure of how 
utility varies along this single, but important, dimension of the space of strategies.  
 
In order to test for bounded optimality it was important to provide an explicit 
and measurable utility regime for the participants. The goal for the participants was to 
copy a set number of items in as fast a time as possible. Utility for participants was 
therefore defined in terms of the time taken to copy all of the items. The faster that all 
items were copied, then the sooner the participants would be paid and could leave the 
laboratory. Importantly, we operationalized errors in terms of time. For example, in 
one condition, only correctly copied items counted towards the total number of items 
copied. Incorrect copies, for example recalling the wrong item, resulted in wasted 
time and a lower reward. As we describe later, participants were instructed to 
correctly copy n appointments as quickly as possible. Further, they were instructed 
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that their choice of number of appointments to be presented/copied should be made to 
achieve this end. There was a trade-off between selecting strategies that appeared 
faster, in the absence of errors, and the increased risk of errors. 
For the purpose of the analysis, as reported in the results, we defined utility in 
terms of the rate at which items were copied. ‘Rate’ refers to the number of items 
copied per second. We use rate as a measure of performance because it can vary as 
the participant progresses through the experimental trials. If participants are 
boundedly optimal then they should make remembering choices that maximize the 
rate at which items are copied. 
Method 
Participants 
Forty native English speaking students from the University of Manchester 
participated in the study. They received £5 ($8.09) as compensation for their time. 
Materials 
Following Gray et al. (2006), the task involves copying information from one 
computer application window to another. However, our task involved copying 
appointment information, where Gray et al.’s (2006) participants copied information 
about a spatial arrangement of colour blocks. A program was written in Microsoft 
Visual Basic 6 that simulated the email and calendar functions from Microsoft 
Outlook. This program ran on an ordinary personal computer with a keyboard and 
mouse. 
To mimic the experience of receiving email, all visual elements of the original 
Outlook interface were reproduced. In addition, a single large button was included in 
the Inbox. The caption for this button was “Click for timeslots”. Clicking on this 
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button caused a message to be displayed in the box to the right of the button. This 
message was of the form “09:00: Appointment with NAME”, where NAME was 
replaced with the name, in capitals, of the person at that appointment time. Each click 
of this button increased the time displayed by one hour and changed the name 
presented. Only one name and appointment was visible at a time (the display is 
illustrated schematically in the left panel of Figure 1).  
Once all appointments had been displayed, a button in the bottom left hand 
corner of the screen labelled “Calendar” was enabled. Clicking this button changed 
the interface into a modified version of the calendar function from Outlook (illustrated 
schematically in the right panel of Figure 1). There were nine different boxes into 
which users could enter text. These boxes corresponded to the appointment times, 
thus the uppermost box was labelled 9.00, the second 10.00 and so on down to the 
bottom box labelled 17.00. Participants entered text into a box by clicking on it and 
typing using the keyboard. Pressing “Tab” cycled down through the boxes. Beneath 
these appointments there was a button labelled “Finished”. All other buttons, menus 
and features of both the Email and Calendar interfaces were disabled. Every time the 
participant clicked a button or entered text via the keyboard the program recorded and 
time-stamped the event. 
A stimulus set of eight male and eight female first names (e.g. ROSE) was 
constructed. All of these to-be-remembered names were deemed familiar to native 
English speakers and were four letters long. Each name began with a different first 
letter. 
Design and Procedure 
Participants were divided into two groups of equal size. The cost of making an 
error (the payoff) was manipulated across the two groups; therefore, they were 
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labelled “Low Error Cost” and “High Error Cost”. In the Low Error Cost condition 
each incorrectly copied appointment was counted as an error. In the High Error Cost 
condition all of the appointments in a trial were counted as errors if one or more of 
them was copied incorrectly. The experiment was divided into two phases; the No-
choice phase followed by the Choice phase. Each phase was completed when 
participants had correctly copied a specified total number of appointments into the 
calendar.  
All participants were instructed that they were required to copy appointments 
from the email application into the calendar. They were told that within each message 
there were two pieces of information: the name of the person to be met and the time 
of the appointment. However, they were also informed that the first appointment was 
always at 09.00 and all appointments were always one hour apart and in sequence, 
therefore, only the names and the order they were presented in needed to be 
remembered. 
Appointments were presented in trials. On each trial, participants were 
required to view between 3 and 9 appointments before the calendar function was 
enabled and appointments could be copied across. The number of appointments that 
participants were required to read before copying across was an independent variable 
during the No-choice phase and a dependent variable during the Choice phase. 
Blocks of seven trials were presented consecutively during the No-choice 
phase. Each trial within a block contained a different number of appointments to be 
copied. Therefore, each of the seven list lengths ranging from 3 appointments up to 9 
appointments was represented once within each block. The order of trial presentation 
within each block was determined randomly. The order varied across blocks and 
across participants. For every appointment, on every trial, the program randomly 
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selected a name from the stimulus set of sixteen names. The only constraint on this 
process was that no name was allocated to more than one appointment on the same 
trial.  
After completing a practice trial containing 3 appointments, all participants 
were asked to copy 200 appointments into the calendar as quickly as possible. It was 
emphasized that making errors was only problematic insofar as it slowed down the 
overall time taken and that their aim should be to finish as quickly as possible, rather 
than finish with as few errors as possible. 
At the start of each trial a screen appeared indicating the total number of 
appointments remaining and the number of appointments that would be presented on 
that particular trial. When participants clicked a button labelled “OK” this screen was 
replaced with the email interface. Participants were presented with each of the 
appointment names in turn and then required to copy the names in uppercase letters 
into the appropriate slots within the calendar. After copying they were free to edit the 
text as much as desired and when satisfied should click the button labelled “Finished”. 
The program then provided feedback about the number of appointments correctly 
copied and highlighted in red any slots incorrectly completed. Any erroneous 
spellings, lowercase letters, or spaces left within a calendar slot when the “Finished” 
button was clicked, caused the item to be scored as an error. When the error feedback 
was provided another button was enabled that participants clicked to begin the next 
trial. Participants could not go back to correct errors, they could only progress to the 
next trial.  
In the High Error Cost group, a single error on any of the appointments meant 
that all of the appointments from that trial were classed as errors and no points were 
awarded. Thus, if there were 8 appointments presented during a High Error Cost trial, 
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and errors were made when copying 3 of them, then the overall total to-be-copied 
would have remained the same. In the Low Error Cost group all appointments 
correctly copied reduced the overall total to be copied. Thus, if there were 8 
appointments presented during a trial and errors were made when copying 3 of them 
then the overall total to-be-copied would have been reduced by 5. In the analysis 
below, we refer to the reduction in the total number of items to-be-copied on a trial as 
the points achieved on the trial. 
After 200 appointments had been correctly copied in the No-choice phase, 
participants received the instructions for the Choice phase. This phase was identical to 
the No-choice phase except that participants were allowed to select the number of 
appointments that were presented on each trial. This choice was implemented at the 
start of each trial by clicking on one of seven buttons labelled 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 or 9, 
respectively. For the choice phase, participants were instructed to correctly copy a 
further 100 appointments as quickly as possible and that their choice of number of 
appointments to be presented/copied should be made to achieve this end.  
The importance of the fact that participants had to correctly copy 100 
appointments during the choice phase is worth restating. If a participant failed to 
correctly copy items then their target of items remaining to be copied was not 
reduced. As a consequence, unlike in many experiments, errors were not merely 
counted by the experimenter, but rather they had real consequences for the time taken 
by the participant.  
 
Results 
Average list length selected 
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Figure 2 is a plot of the mean rate at which items were copied against list 
length (number of items) for both the no-choice and the choice data.  The mean rate at 
which items were copied was calculated according to the following procedure. For 
every trial, we recorded the trial duration, the selected length (3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 or 9 
items), and the number of appointments correctly copied. The trial duration was 
defined as the interval between the end of the previous trial and the end of the current 
trial. This duration therefore included the time cost of moving from one trial to the 
next.  For each participant and each list length (number of appointments), the rate Rk 
for a trial was then calculated by dividing the number of appointments copied by the 
amount of time taken for the trial. We then calculated an average rate for each 
participant and each list length. 
In the low cost condition, a single point was awarded for each successfully 
copied item. For example, a participant who attempted to copy 5 items and made 1 
error would get 4 points. In the high cost condition, a single point was awarded for 
each successfully copied item, unless there were any errors in which case no points 
were awarded. For the same example, attempting to copy 5 items and making 1 error 
would result in no points. We defined an error as a failure to copy an item correctly. 
As we have said, an important property of the rate is that error costs are 
reflected in the measure because when participants made errors it cost them time (by 
an amount contingent on the condition). We refer to the list length (number of 
appointments held in memory) associated with the highest rate of copies as the 
boundedly optimal list length. We assume that the boundedly optimal strategy 
involved the selection of the boundedly optimal list length. 
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Participants did not all complete the same number of trials because while they 
were required to copy 100 appointments during the choice phase, they were free to 
choose how many to copy on each trial.   
In Figure 2 it can be seen that for the Low Error Cost condition the mean list 
length selected was 5.05 (SD = .67; Mode = 4.93, SD = .69) and for the High Error 
Cost condition the mean selection was 5.00 (SD = .78; Mode = 4.98, SD = .80). There 
was no statistically significant difference between the conditions for the means or 
modes (ts < 1). The absence of a difference in the choice phase list length is 
disappointing but, conversely, it can be seen in Figure 2 that the mean participant 
choice in both conditions is predicted by the no-choice phase rates. 
Figure 2 gives the illusion that the rate for each list length was a point value 
when in fact they were distributions. This is made clear in Figure 3 which shows the 
frequency distribution of rate for each list length across all participants in both cost 
conditions and across both choice, and no-choice phases, of the experiment. 
Qualitatively, the figure suggests that some choice discriminations are relatively easy. 
It is easy to see that a list length of 9 is worse than a list length of 4. Other 
discriminations, e.g. between 4 and 5 are relatively difficult because of the overlap in 
the rate distributions.  
Correlation between the boundedly optimal list length and the selected list length 
In Figure 2 there appears to be a correspondence between the strategy with the 
highest rate in the no-choice phase and the chosen strategy in both conditions. In 
order to test this hypothesis further we first defined the mean boundedly optimal list 
length Bp for each participant p, as 
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Where s is one of the set of possible list lengths S and the rate of reward for a 
list length, Rp,s is defined above. Bp is therefore defined as the list length s that 
maximised the rate R for participant p. 
We pooled participants from both conditions and found a significant 
correlation between the boundedly optimal list length and the list length that 
participants actually selected, r(38) = .35, p = 0.027. Participants for whom it was 
predicted that they would take on larger list lengths did so, suggesting that the 
boundedly optimal list length predicted 12.25% of the variation between participants. 
This finding offers initial support for bounded optimality. Given the assumption that 
the boundedly optimal strategy involves the selection of the list length that allows 
each participant to maximise their own utility, then we know that the boundedly 
optimal strategy predicted by the theory is correlated with the list length actually 
selected by participants. 
 
Probability matching 
Before analysing the extent to which people were bounded optimal, we first 
wanted to reject the possibility that participants probability matched. The idea was 
that rather than using a strategy involving a list length that yielded the maximum 
utility, participants selected a list length in proportion to the probability that the 
strategy yielded the maximum utility, that is the highest rate of copies (e.g. see 
Shanks et al., 2002; Walsh & Anderson, 2009). We took the list length that each 
participant selected most frequently during the choice phase, called the highest 
frequency list length, and plotted the probability selected against the probability that it 
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was the list length that maximised utility. If the participants were probability 
matching then we expected Figure 4 to show a straight line through 0,0 and 1,1. 
However, there was no significant correlation between the logit transformed 
probability selected and probability optimal (r(38) = .061, p = .707).  
 
Frequency of Utility Maximisation 
We tested whether the highest frequency list length selected by participants 
was selected more frequently than was predicted by probability matching.  We first 
found the list length that was selected most frequently by each participant. We then 
found the probability that this list length was boundedly optimal for that individual. 
Recall that each list length has a distribution of rate (Figure 3) and so the probability 
that a list length is boundedly optimal is simply the probability that a sample of that 
list length’s rate is greater than a sample of any other list length’s rate. The data for 
both list length and probability were positively skewed and we therefore used a 
permutation test. A permutation test, with 10,000 resamples, contrasting probability 
selected and probability maximum utility, was significant p < .001.  The mean 
probability boundedly optimal was 0.49 and the mean probability of selection of the 
most frequent list length was 0.80. Participants were significantly more likely to select 
their highest frequency list length than was predicted by probability matching 
(reflected in the fact that most of the data in Figure 4 are above the probability 
matching line).  
 
 
Comparing boundedly optimal to suboptimal choice 
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We were interested in comparing the predictions of the boundedly optimal list 
length to list lengths that implied the encoding of fewer items in memory and to list 
lengths that involved encoding more items in memory. We examined the means of all 
list lengths with fewer items (optimal-1, optimal-2 etc.) and found that optimal-1 
predicted as many selections, or more, than all others that had fewer items. The 
corresponding result was found for optimal+1. For this reason we focused these 
analyses on optimal-1 and optimal+1 (if optimal-1 performs worse than the boundedly 
optimal list length then optimal-n will also perform worse). The optimal-1 list length 
offers a test of the offloading hypothesis; this is the hypothesis that people routinely 
offload to the environment. Contrasting the maximum utility list length (max) to 
optimal-1 and optimal+1 offers a test of the precision of the predictions. Figure 5 is a 
bar graph contrasting the average percentage of trials on which each of bounded 
optimal, optimal-1, and optimal+1 list lengths predicted participant performance. On 
average, boundedly optimal predicted 55% (SD = 32) of participant selections, 
whereas optimal-1 and optimal+1 predicted 8% (SD = 12) and 17% (SD = 24) 
respectively. 
A permutation test was used with 10,000 resamples to contrast the proportion 
of predicted selections in the choice phase for each of the three list lengths (bounded 
optimal, optimal-1, and optimal+1). The permutation test was used because the 
distributions for optimal-1 and optimal+1 were skewed.  The boundedly optimal theory 
was a better predictor of selections than optimal-1 (p < .001), and a better predictor of 
selections than optimal+1 (p < .001). Optimal-1 and optimal+1 were equally poor 
predictors. All other strategies, for example, optimal-2, optimal-3, predicted even fewer 
selections.  
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Individual differences 
We wanted to investigate individual differences across trials. For each 
participant and each trial, we computed the probability that a random use of any one 
list length would be better, that is deliver a higher rate of copies, than a random use of 
any of the other list lengths. The distribution of rates for each list length was set to the 
empirical distribution of rates for each list length for values over trials 1 to k-1. The 
computation of the probability was achieved using 1000 Monte Carlo trials for each 
list length on each trial of the experiment. 
For example, consider a scenario in which there were only list lengths of 3 and 
4. If participant 1 had experienced rates R3 = (0.4, 0.3, 0.4, 0.7) for list length 3 and 
rates of R4 = (0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.6, 0.5) for list length 4 then probabilities were calculated 
by sampling n pairs with replacement, with one element of each pair from R3 and R4 
and then counting the frequency that the sample for 3 was greater than the sampled 
rate for 4. For example, if the sample generated from R3 was 0.7 and from R4 was 0.2 
then the frequency that list length 3 was better than list length 4 would be incremented 
by 1. Once calculated, for each individual participant on each trial, this frequency was 
divided by the total number of sampled pairs, n, so as to generate the probability that 
each list length would generate a higher rate. In the analysis of the results presented 
below, rather than in this illustrative example, samples were taken from all 7 list 
lengths and the probabilities were calculated for each list length relative to all other 
list lengths.  
The advantage of probability best, over rate (used previously), is that it is 
sensitive to the uncertainty in the rate associated with each strategy, as represented by 
the empirical distribution functions. Probability best is a measure of the likelihood 
that a strategy is boundedly optimal for the individual participant. One strategy, for 
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example using a list length of 6-appointments, may be associated with a higher mean 
rate than a strategy using a 5-appointments list length but may also have much higher 
variation, or the two strategies may have such high variation that they are effectively 
indistinguishable; the probability best measure is sensitive to the distribution of 
rewards for each strategy. 
We plotted the probability that utility was maximised with each list length. In 
Figure 6 each panel represents the likelihood that each list length maximised utility 
given a particular participant's trial-to-trial experience through the experiment.  
Participants 8, 5, 4, 12, 13, and 14 were selected to represent the diversity of 
performance. In each panel, the no-choice phase is to the left of the vertical bar and 
the choice phase is to the right. Circles represent the selected list length. Each list 
length is represented with a different colour. We analysed all participants irrespective 
of condition. 
Participants 4, 12, 13, and 14 (Figure 6) are presented because each selected 
the boundedly optimal list length on the majority of trials. In addition, each of these 
participants chose a different list length from the others and the figure, therefore, 
illustrates some of the individual differences in performance. For participant 4, a list 
length of 7 allowed them to maximise utility and the participant selected a list length 
of 7. For participant 12, list length 4 was boundedly optimal and the participant 
selected list length 4. For participant 13, list length 5 was boundedly optimal and the 
participant selected this list length on the majority of trials. For participant 14, list 
length 6 was the boundedly optimal and it was also selected. In addition, for 
participant 14, while list length 6 was not the boundedly optimal at the beginning of 
the choice phase, practice improved its performance to the extent that it became the 
boundedly optimal list length.  
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Participant 5 (Figure 6) was selected because there was no clear boundedly 
optimal list length. All strategies have probabilities below about 0.4 and three of the 
strategies (4, 5 and 6) have probabilities in a narrow range between 0.2 and 0.4. On 
some trials the participant selected list length 6 and on some list length 5, but these 
strategies and list length 4 are indistinguishable (it is not clear that there is a distinct 
boundedly optimal list length).  
Participant 8 (Figure 6) was selected because their behaviour illustrates choice 
phase performance that is not predicted by the theory. For this participant, by the end 
of the choice phase, the probability that list length 4 is the boundedly optimal list 
length is about 0.5 and the probability of all of the others is below 0.2. Despite the 
discrimination between the probabilities, the participant has selected a list length that 
is unlikely to allow them to maximise utility (list length 6) on the majority of choice 
phase trials.   
Plots of the probability that each list length maximised utility for each 
participant are provided in Supplementary A. 
 
Regression of selection against trial 
We analysed whether participants were more likely to select the optimal list 
length with trial. We estimated the fixed effect of trial on whether, or not, bounded 
optimality predicted list length selection. A repeated measures logistic regression 
computed probability boundedly optimal for the selected list length against trial and 
revealed a significant positive slope (p < 0.001). Participants were more likely to 
select the boundedly optimal list length as trial progressed. Figure 7 displays a plot of 
the fit for each participant. 
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Discussion 
 
The results offer support for the bounded optimality hypothesis.  
(1) As predicted, there was a positive correlation between the 
boundedly optimal list length and the selected list length; 
individuals who were predicted, on the basis of their measured 
performance across the strategy space, to choose a higher working 
memory load did, in fact, do so.  While the magnitude of the errors 
points to variation, there is indication that strategy choice is 
sensitive to individual performance. 
(2) As predicted individuals were more likely to select the list length 
with the maximum utility than list lengths that involved encoding 
more or fewer items in memory (see Figure 5). Further, a repeated 
measures logistic regression showed that participants were 
significantly more likely to select the boundedly optimal list length 
with practice. 
 Despite the positive evidence, a substantial portion of the data could not be 
accounted for as boundedly optimal choice of list length. For example, 8 participants 
became less likely to select the boundedly optimal strategy as trials progressed (they 
exhibit a negative slope in the regression reported in Figure 7). Four other participants 
persistently selected a list length that was not bounded optimal. (They exhibit a flat 
regression slope in Figure 7). We return to this result in the General Discussion. In 
addition, the manipulation of the external reward signal failed to generate a difference 
in either the predicted list length or in the list length selected by participants.  These  
problems are addressed in the design of Experiment 2. 
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Experiment 2 
While Experiment 1 offered some support for the hypothesis that individuals 
would choose to use bounded optimality list lengths, there was no effect of the 
manipulation of payoff function on the strategies selected by participants. Therefore, 
in Experiment 2, rather than manipulate the cost of an error, we manipulated the 
number of points awarded for a successful copy such that, in one condition, there was 
a greater incentive to copy larger list lengths (more details are given below).  
Method 
Participants 
Twenty native English-speaking students from the University of Manchester 
participated in the study. They received £5 ($8.09) as compensation for their time. 
Design and Procedure 
The goal for the participant was to score a set total of points by copying 
appointments into the appropriate slots in the calendar. As in the “Low Error Cost” 
condition of Experiment 1, a score for a trial was computed from the number of 
correctly copied appointments made when copying other appointments. Zero points 
were awarded for errors. 
The key manipulation was the relationship between the number of 
appointments copied on a single trial and the number of points received for that trial. 
This was a between participant manipulation across two groups of equal size. In the 
“Linear” group participants received a single point for each appointment correctly 
copied. The total number of appointments to be copied in the Choice phase was 
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doubled from Experiment 1, meaning participants had to score 200 points in both the 
No-choice and the Choice phases. In all other respects, the Linear condition was the 
same as the Low Error Cost condition from Experiment 1.  
In the “Exponential” group, the number of points received for a trial increased 
exponentially according to the number of appointments correctly copied. Specifically, 
for copying 1 appointment participants received 1 point and the total trial points for 
each additional correctly copied appointment were 2, 3, 4, 7, 11, 17, 27 and 42. The 
target number of points in both the No-choice and the Choice phases was set at 310 
points. This number was derived from the mean data from the Low Error Cost 
condition in Experiment 1. Assuming participants made the same number of errors on 
the same trials, then during the No-choice phase participants would take the same 
number of trials to reach 310 points in the Exponential condition as it took to reach 
200 points in the Linear condition. This kept the amount of practice prior to the 
Choice phase approximately equivalent across both groups. Of course, these points 
totals did not necessarily result in both groups completing the same number of trials 
during the Choice phase – indeed the purpose of our manipulation is to produce a 
difference between the two groups.  
At the start of the experiment all participants were given a table and graphic 
that outlined the relationship, between appointments copied and points scored, that 
was specific to their condition. It was emphasized to participants that they should aim 
to score the target points total as quickly as possible. All other aspects of the method 
were the same as in Experiment 1. 
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Results 
Unless stated otherwise, all measures are computed and analysed in the same 
way as for Experiment 1, except that here rate refers to the number of points acquired 
per second rather than the number of items. 
Later trials on which fewer than 10 participants contributed were excluded. 
The following analyses, therefore, use data from the no-choice phase and trials 1 to 39 
of the choice phase. No other data was excluded from the analyses. The mean number 
of trials completed in the no-choice phase did not differ between the Exponential 
condition (M = 41.10, SD = 16.40) and the Linear condition [M = 46.60, SD = 6.36, 
t(18) < 1]. 
 
Average List length Selected 
The mean list length that participants selected was larger in the Exponential 
condition (M = 6.99, SD = 1.32) than in the Linear condition [M = 5.07, SD = .78; 
t(18) = 3.98, p = .001, d = 1.33] supporting the hypothesis that people can adapt 
remembering strategies to the objective points-based utility function specified in the 
instructions. The average of each participant’s mode list length produced the same 
significant difference [Exponential, M = 7.20, SD = 1.62; Linear, M = 4.90, SD = .99; 
t(18) = 3.83, p = .002, d = 1.31]. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 8, where the 
rate at which items were copied is plotted against the list length.  
Correlation between the boundedly optimal list length and the selected list length 
As with Experiment 1, we pooled participants from both conditions and found 
a significant correlation between the boundedly optimal list length and the list length 
that participants actually selected, r(18) = .77, p < .001. The RMSE was 1.34 and the 
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boundedly optimal list length explained 59.29% of the variance. Participants for 
whom it was predicted that they would select larger list lengths did so, suggesting that 
boundedly optimal choice predicted a substantial part of the variation between 
participants. While the correlation does not tell us whether participants were biased, it 
does tell us that participants who were measurably able to copy larger list lengths did 
so. 
Probability matching 
As with Experiment 1, for each participant and each trial, we computed the 
probability that a random use of any one list length, and therefore strategy, would be 
better; that is would deliver a higher rate, than a random selection of any of the other 
list lengths. The computation was achieved using 1000 Monte Carlo trials for each list 
length on each trial of the experiment. Each list length was represented by the 
empirical distribution function formed from the values of its rate over trials 1 to k-1. 
Figure 9 is a plot of each participant’s most frequently selected list length. It 
provides a representation of the extent to which probability of selection was predicted 
by the probability that the selection was bounded optimal. If, on average, participants 
used probability matching then probability selected should match probability bounded 
optimal. The line of best fit should pass through 0,0 and 1,1. While there was a 
correlation [r(18) = .62, p = .003], a permutation test revealed that participants were 
significantly more likely to select the most frequent choice than predicted by 
probability matching [p < .001]. 
Individual differences 
Inspection of the individual plots, of probability boundedly optimal versus 
trial, revealed a similar pattern of individual variation as that observed in Experiment 
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1. First, 12 of the 20 participants (5 in the Exponential condition, 7 in the Linear 
condition) selected the boundedly optimal list length on the majority of trials. 2 
participants selected between a set of strategies all of which could have been the 
boundedly optimal, but which were essentially indistinguishable, and 6 participants 
systematically selected a list length that was not the predicted list length. Of this last 
group, 4 participants selected larger strategies than the bounded optimal, and 2 
selected smaller strategies than predicted by bounded optimality (all within +- 2 of the 
bounded optimal). Plots of the likelihood that each list length maximised utility for 
each participant are provided in Supplementary B. 
We visually inspected the response data file where all key-presses and mouse 
clicks were recorded. This log showed that for 49% of trials in the Exponential 
condition, during the recall phase, participants did not initially enter the complete 
names in each box. Instead, they selected each response box in turn and only entered 
the first letter of a name in each box. Once a letter had been entered in each box they 
then returned and entered the remaining letters of the name. This strategy was less 
frequently observed in the Linear condition (17% of trials), where participants entered 
the complete name in a box and rarely returned to a box subsequently. This strategy 
offered less benefit for the Linear condition as there was less reward for accurately 
remembering large list lengths. The mean list length selected was larger for the first 
letter strategy (M = 6.65, SD = 1.70) than the complete name strategy [M = 5.46, SD = 
1.01, t(23) = 2.10, p < .05, d = .80]. 
 
Comparing boundedly optimal to suboptimal choice 
We compared the maximum utility list length to a list length that involved one 
fewer items in memory (optimal-1) and a list length that involved encoding one more 
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item (optimal+1). Figure 10 is a barplot of the percentage of trials on which each of the 
three strategies (bounded optimal, optimal+1 and optimal-1) predicted a participant’s 
selection. 
Permutation tests were used to contrast the proportion of predicted selections 
in the choice phase for each list length. (The distributions for optimal-1 and optimal+1 
were positively skewed.) The boundedly optimal strategy was a better predictor of 
selections than optimal-1 (p = .003), and a better predictor of selections than optimal+1 
(p = .004). Neither optimal-1, nor optimal+1, was a better predictor than the other. On 
average boundedly optimal predicted 46% (SD = 33) of participant selections, 
whereas, optimal-1 and optimal+1 predicted 12% (SD = 13) and 14% (SD = 17), 
respectively. We used a repeated measures logistic regression to test whether each 
theory – bounded optimal, optimal-1, and optimal+1 - predicted more, or fewer, 
participant selections with trial. We found no effect of trial on whether optimal 
predicted the choice p = 0.1285. We did find an effect of trial on whether optimal-1 
predicted the choice p = 0.006. There was also an effect of trial on whether optimal+1 
predicted the choice p = 0.0391. Both optimal-1 and optimal+1 become significantly 
worse at predicting the participant’s choice. 
Discussion  
In Experiment 2, half of the participants received exponentially increasing 
rewards for those list lengths, and therefore those strategies, that required more 
memory. The other half received linearly increasing reward. As predicted, individuals 
in the exponential condition selected significantly larger list lengths than individuals 
who received linearly increasing rewards, demonstrating that participants can adapt 
choice of memory strategy to utility. Evidence that participants not only adapted, but 
were also boundedly optimal was also present. The boundedly optimal list length was 
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a significantly better predictor than either optimal-1 or optimal+1 supporting the idea 
that participants were boundedly optimal. However, it was also the case that many 
participants failed to select the predicted list length. 
 
General Discussion 
Two experiments used the no-choice/choice paradigm to test the hypothesis 
that individuals can make boundedly optimal choices when remembering items for 
short periods of time. The no-choice phase of the experimental paradigm allowed us 
to empirically measure performance on a range of strategies and, thereby, calculate 
the boundedly optimal strategy for each individual. The choice phase allowed us to 
test the prediction that people would not only adapt but that they would do so by 
choosing a list length, and therefore a strategy, that maximized utility.  The findings 
(Experiment 2) are consistent with previous findings (Gray et al., 2006) that people 
are able to adapt their use of memory; on average people choose to remember a 
different number of items depending on the payoff regime. In addition, both 
Experiments 1 and 2 offered evidence that adaptations of the majority of participants 
were bounded optimal. In both experiments, the boundedly optimal strategy offered 
significantly better predictions of average performance than strategies with fewer 
items, or more items, than the boundedly optimal strategy – suggesting that the 
hypothesis that people minimize the use of memory (Ballard, Hayhoe, Pook, & Rao, 
1997; Hollan, Hutchins, & Kirsch, 2000) is inconsistent with the evidence and further 
supporting the hypothesis that people are adaptive to costs and benefits (Payne, et al., 
2001; Gray et al., 2006). Further, in Experiment 1 regression analysis indicated that 
with practice participants became significantly more likely to select the boundedly 
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optimal strategy as they experienced more trials. Correlations between optimal and 
selected for each individual suggest that in both experiments the majority of 
participants adapted to their own individual performance characteristics. The 
individual differences between these participants were therefore not merely described 
but predicted by the bounded optimality analysis. 
The validity of these findings is contingent on the effectiveness of the no-
choice/choice utility learning paradigm (Siegler & Lemaire, 1997; Walsh & 
Anderson, 2009) which allowed us to determine the utility of strategies other than that 
chosen by the participants. Validity was also contingent on the fact that participants 
were asked to maximise an explicit utility function. Errors were operationalized in 
terms of time. To the extent that the results showed which participants were bounded 
optimal, they did so given a paradigm in which utility, and therefore optimality, 
involved a quantifiable speed/accuracy trade-off. People can, it appears, adjust what 
they choose to remember over short time periods so as to maximise utility given 
speed/accuracy constraints, at least, they did so in the reported studies. 
The Value for the Current Work 
Experiments 1 and 2 go beyond previous work (e.g. Payne et al. 2001; Gray et 
al., 2006) in three important respects. First, the experiments add support for the idea 
that the majority of people can, not only, adapt their use of memory but in addition 
they can adapt to just the right extent. On the whole, if a participant could achieve 
their highest rate with a list length of say 5 then this is the list length that they used 
when given a choice. No previous experiments requiring people to remember items 
for short time periods has demonstrated that behaviour is substantially consistent with 
a theory that demands boundedly optimal adaptation. Second, the results show that 
these participants maximized the rate at which items were copied by choosing an 
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individually appropriate list length. The correlations between boundedly optimal list 
length and chosen list length in both experiments show that participants who copied 
items at a higher rate with a particular list length chose that list length during the 
choice phase of the experiment. 
Third, the results show that some participants failed to choose a boundedly 
optimal list length. The fact that the experience of some of these individuals led to no 
clear boundedly optimal list length suggests one explanation, but other participants 
failed to choose what the analysis shows was a clear bounded optimum. We discuss, 
below, the implications of this apparent form of ‘suboptimality’ and its relationship to 
the findings of Fu and Gray (2004). 
 
Future Work 
Explaining behaviour that was not bounded optimal 
There were 13 (out of 60) participants in the two studies who persistently 
selected a list length, and therefore a strategy, that was not bounded optimal, for 
example participant 8 in Figure 6. Visual inspection of the probability boundedly 
optimal for each list length, as presented in Figure 6, suggests that given the evidence 
available to these participants, they should not have been unsure about which was 
best, yet they persistently failed to select this list length. If there was a clear 
boundedly optimal strategy then exploration of suboptimal list lengths should have 
been unnecessary. These participants did not all select a larger, or all select a smaller 
list length; although 10 of the 13 participants selected a list length that was larger, 
usually by 1 more memory item, than that associated with the boundedly optimal 
strategy.  
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One explanation for the behaviour of these 13 participants is that they were 
somehow less able than others to determine the relative utility of different list lengths; 
in other words, it is plausible that they simply failed to appreciate the correct utility 
ranking. Just as some participants were less able to remember items, so some may 
have been less able to determine the relative utility of remembering more or fewer 
items. If this is the case then it is possible that these participants are boundedly 
optimal given their utility discrimination capacity. However, further studies are 
required to test this hypothesis. 
Another possible explanation is that participants believed that practising sub-
optimal strategies would make the strategies optimal. Many of the participants who 
did eventually achieve a boundedly optimal remembering strategy, did so by 
practising a list length that was initially sub-optimal. Practice both improved the 
performance of the strategy and reduced uncertainty about its performance. For 
example, see participant 4 in Figure 6.  Again, further evidence is required. 
Lastly, it is possible that people exhibit stable suboptimalities (Fu & Gray, 
2004). Evidence reported by Fu and Gray (2004) who studied users of computer 
applications suggests that the preferred, less efficient procedures, have two 
characteristics: (i) the preferred procedure is well practised and can be deployed for a 
variety of task environments, and (ii) the preferred procedure has a structure that gives 
step-by-step feedback on progress, or in other words, it is more interactive. According 
to Fu and Gray (2004) these participants are suboptimal because they are biased to use 
more interactive and general procedures. This bias towards procedures that are 
globally efficient leads people to exhibit stable local suboptimalities. However, Payne 
and Howes (2013) point out that “any conclusion of suboptimality is relative to a 
particular theory of utility, and local suboptimalities may well be globally optimal. 
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The challenge is to find a theory of utility, context (global or local), and mechanism 
that explains the observed behaviour. One aspect of such an approach would involve a 
systematic exploration the implications of different theories of subjective reward 
(Singh, Lewis, Barto & Sorg, 2010; Janssen & Gray, 2010). Ultimately suboptimal 
adaptation to memory must be explained. The character of the explanation, we 
anticipate, will have the form: “people were not adapting to X but to Y." (p. 76) 
 
Explaining exploration 
When people learn a new task, over repeated trials, they engage in both 
exploratory and exploitative behaviours. They must sometimes choose strategies in 
order to exploit knowledge about likely rewards and they must sometimes choose 
strategies in order to explore what the rewards are for each strategy (Cohen, McClure 
& Yu, 2007; Sutton & Barto, 1998). Indeed, exploration is one benefit of probability 
matching. For the most part, the studies reported in the current article focused on how 
people exploit the knowledge that they have gained during a no-choice phase, which 
might be described as a forced exploration of the strategy space. More specifically, 
the focus was on how, during the choice phase, people exploit the knowledge that 
they have gained on previous trials.  
While our analysis focused on exploitation, it is evident that participants may 
have engaged in some exploratory behaviour, at least at the beginning of the choice 
phase.  Regression analysis of the Experiment 1 data showed that participants were 
significantly less likely to select the boundedly optimal strategy at the beginning of 
the choice phase than toward the end. Further, analyses suggested that probability 
matching did not do well at explaining how exploration/exploitation was managed 
(Figures 3 and 8). A fuller analysis of the observed exploratory behaviour might test 
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an optimal data selection theory of which strategies people choose to explore 
(Oaksford & Chater, 1994, 2003; Oaksford & Wakefield, 2003; Nelson, 2005, 2008; 
Lelis & Howes, 2011). For example, it might be the case that on earlier choice trials, 
when the performance of each strategy is still relatively unclear, that participants 
choose a strategy so as to maximise gain in information, rather than to maximise 
immediate reward. One possibility is that participants in our experiments 
operationalized the value of information in terms of the extent that it facilitated 
discrimination between the alternative memory strategies. Another possibility is that 
they operationalized value as the expected gain in choice utility obtained by a likely 
choice reversal (assuming that when not deliberately exploring they would exploit the 
boundedly optimal choice). See Lelis and Howes (2011) for a discussion. 
Discriminating between these theories in the utility learning paradigm that we 
have investigated above is beyond the scope of the current article, but the no-
choice/choice paradigm may be useful in the future. The key strength of the paradigm 
– that it exposes the distribution of the reward for each strategy in the strategy space –
should allow a-priori prediction of the information gain from each choice. 
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Figure 1. Experiment 1. The experimental apparatus. On each trial participants were 
first presented with the ‘email display’. They clicked the ‘click for time slots’ button 
until all appointments had been shown. The ‘calendar’ button then became available 
and pressing it caused the display to change to ‘calendar display’. They then entered 
the names that they could remember into the time slots and pressed ‘finished’. 
 
Figure 2. Experiment 1: Mean rate at which items were copied for each list length in 
the no-choice phase and for the average list length chosen in the choice phase. Error 
bars are the 95% confidence interval for the mean chosen list length. 
 
Figure 3. Experiment 1: The frequency distributions of the rate at which items could 
be copied with each list length. Data is for all participants in both conditions (n=40) 
and for both no-choice and choice phases.  
 
Figure 4. Experiment 1: Probability selected versus probability bounded optimal for 
each participant’s most frequently used list length. Probability matching predicts a 
straight line regression through 0,0 and 1,1 – which is not supported by these data. 
 
Figure 5. Experiment 1: Percentage of predicted choice phase selections for the 
bounded optimal, optimal-1, optimal+1, and the selected strategy. Error bars are the 
95% confidence interval for each strategy.  
 
Figure 6. Experiment 1. Six panels that give illustrative examples of individual 
performance across trials. The probability that a strategy was the bounded optimal 
strategy is plotted against trial (see the text for a description of how this probability 
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was calculated). Each strategy is represented by a different color. The selected 
strategy is represented by a circle. Participant 8 (top left) failed to find the bounded 
optimal strategy. Participant 5 (top right) did not exhibit a distinct bounded optimal 
strategy. Participant 4 (middle left) initially practiced a strategy lower than the 
optimal (strategy 6) before persistently selecting the bounded optimal strategy 
(strategy 7). Participant 12 (middle right) persistently selected the bounded optimal 
strategy (strategy 4) but also explored a higher memory strategy (strategy 5). 
Participant 13 (bottom left) persistently selected the bounded optimal strategy 
(strategy 5). Participant 14 (bottom right) practiced a strategy that became the 
bounded optimal. 
 
Figure 7. Experiment 1. Plots of repeated measures logistic regressions of probability 
optimal selection (y-axis) against trial (x-axis) for each individual participant. Each 
plot indicates the probability that a participant selected the optimal list length with 
trial. (No axis labels are provided because of the number of plots.) 
 
Figure 8. Experiment 2: Mean rate at which items were copied for each list length in 
the no-choice phase and for the average list length chosen in the choice phase. Error 
bars are the 95% confidence interval for the mean chosen list length. 
 
Figure 9. Experiment 2. Probability selected versus probability bounded optimal for 
each participants most frequently used strategy. Probability matching predicts a 
straight line regression through 0,0 and 1,1. While there is a significant correlation 
[r(18) = .62, p = .003 ], probability bounded optimal and probability selected are 
significantly different [ V = 20, p < .001 ]. 
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Figure 10. Experiment 2: Percentage of choice phase selections predicted by the 
bounded optimal, optimal+1, optimal-1 and the selected strategy against trial (choice 
phase only). Error bars are the 95% confidence interval for each strategy.  
Figure'1'''
'
Time Name
09:00 JACK
10:00
11:00
12:00
13:00
14:00
15:00
16:00
17:00
Click for time slots
Email display
Calendar Finished
10:00 
Appointment 
with ROSE
Calendar display
Figure'2'
'
'
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
list length
ra
te
 ite
m
s c
op
ied
 (i
te
m
s p
er
 se
c)
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
●
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
Figure 
 Rate items copied in low cost condition (red triangles) and high cost condition (black circles).
●
●
no−choice high cost
no−choice low cost
choice high cost
choice low cost
Figure'3'
'
'
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
2
4
6
8
0
2
4
6
8
0
2
4
6
8
0
2
4
6
8
0
2
4
6
8
0
2
4
6
8
0
2
4
6
8
0
2
4
6
8
0
2
4
6
8
density of each strategy (all participants)
rate (items per sec)
de
ns
ity
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
choice
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0
2
4
6
8
10
0
2
4
6
8
10
0
2
4
6
8
10
0
2
4
6
8
10
0
2
4
6
8
10
0
2
4
6
8
10
0
2
4
6
8
10
0
2
4
6
8
10
Experiment 1 Rate (all participants, both phases)
rate (items per sec)
fre
qu
en
cy 3
4
5
6
7
8
9
mean
Figure'4'
'
'
Figure'5'
'
'
optimal(−1) bounded optimal optimal(+1)
strategy
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 ch
oic
es
 p
re
dic
te
d
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
Figure'6'
'
'
40 60 80 100 120
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
trial
p(b
ou
nd
ed
 op
tim
al)
participant 8
●●● ●●●●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●●●●●
●●●●●
●
●●●
●●
●
●
●
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
choice
40 60 80 100 120
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
trial
p(b
ou
nd
ed
 op
tim
al)
participant 5
●●●●●●●●●
●
●●
●
●
●●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●●
●●
●
40 60 80 100 120
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
trial
p(b
ou
nd
ed
 op
tim
al)
participant 4
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
40 60 80 100 120
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
trial
p(b
ou
nd
ed
 op
tim
al)
participant 12
●●●●●●●●●●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●●
●
●
●●●
●
40 60 80 100 120
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
trial
p(b
ou
nd
ed
 op
tim
al)
participant 13
●●
●
●●●
●●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●●
●●
●
●
40 60 80 100 120
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
trial
p(b
ou
nd
ed
 op
tim
al)
participant 14
●●●●●●●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●●●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●
Figure'7.'
'
'
Index
y
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8
participant 1
intercept −25.57 slope 0
Index
y
participant 2
intercept 1.66 slope −0.09
Index
y
participant 3
intercept 0.33 slope 0.08
Index
y
participant 4
intercept −4.2 slope 0.4
Index
y
participant 5
intercept −2.04 slope 0.05
Index
y
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8
participant 6
intercept −0.54 slope 0.09
Index
y
participant 7
intercept 3.07 slope −0.14
Index
y
participant 8
intercept −25.57 slope 0
Index
y
participant 9
intercept 3 slope −0.06
Index
y
participant 10
intercept −0.88 slope −0.3
Index
y
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8
participant 11
intercept −0.87 slope 0.02
Index
y
participant 12
intercept −1.15 slope 0.22
Index
y
participant 13
intercept −99.46 slope 39.75
Index
y
participant 14
intercept −230.11 slope 41.83
Index
y
participant 15
intercept −99.46 slope 39.75
Index
y
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8
participant 16
intercept −9.62 slope 0.92
Index
y
participant 17
intercept −2.11 slope 0.1
Index
y
participant 18
intercept 4.42 slope −0.35
Index
y
participant 19
intercept −5.98 slope 0.41
Index
y
participant 20
intercept −1.76 slope 0.43
Index
y
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8
participant 21
intercept 2.72 slope −0.08
Index
y
participant 22
intercept −0.08 slope 0.09
Index
y
participant 23
intercept −621.62 slope 40.11
Index
y
participant 24
intercept −0.82 slope 0.19
Index
y
participant 25
intercept −0.71 slope 0.84
Index
y
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8
participant 26
intercept −257.02 slope 39.54
Index
y
participant 27
intercept 4.77 slope −0.19
Index
y
participant 28
intercept −5.02 slope 0.34
Index
y
participant 29
intercept −663.5 slope 40.21
Index
y
participant 30
intercept −25.57 slope 0
Index
y
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8
participant 31
intercept 0.85 slope 0.31
Index
y
participant 32
intercept −262.39 slope 40.37
Index
y
participant 33
intercept −5.54 slope 0.17
Index
y
participant 34
intercept −99.46 slope 39.75
Index
y
participant 35
intercept −25.57 slope 0
Index
y
0 10 20 30 40
0.
0
0.
4
0.
8
participant 36
intercept −1.33 slope −0.09
Index
y
0 10 20 30 40
participant 37
intercept 2.63 slope −0.13
Index
y
0 10 20 30 40
participant 38
intercept 0.16 slope 0.27
Index
y
0 10 20 30 40
participant 39
intercept −1.52 slope 0.71
Index
y
0 10 20 30 40
participant 40
intercept −180.99 slope 40.21
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
'b
ou
nd
ed
'o
pt
im
al
'
Trial'
Figure'8'
'
'
3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
list length
ra
te
  (
po
int
s p
er
 se
c)
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
●
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
Figure 
 Rate items copied in linear condition (black circles) and exponential condition (red triangles).
●
●
no−choice exponential cost
no−choice linear cost
choice exponential cost
choice linear cost
Figure'9'
'
'
Figure'10'
'
'
optimal−1 bounded optimal optimal+1
strategy
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 ch
oic
es
 p
re
dic
te
d
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
optimal(−1) bounded optimal optimal(+1)
strategy
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 ch
oic
es
 p
re
dic
te
d
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 11
●●●●●●●●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
choice
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 12
●●●●●●●●●●●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●●
●
●
●●●
●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 13
●●●●●●●●●●●
●
●●●
●●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●●
●●
●
●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 14
●●●●●●●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●●●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 15
●●●●●●●●●●●●
●
●●●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●●
●●
●●
●●
●
●●●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 16
●●●●●●●●●●●●●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●●
●
●●
●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 17
●●●●●●●
●
●●
●
●●●●●●●
●
●●●●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●●
●
●●●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●●
●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 18
●●●●●●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●●●
●
●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 19
●●●●●●●●●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●●●
●
●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 20
●●●●●●●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●●
●●
●
●●
●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 31
●●●●●●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●●●
●
●●
●
●●●
●
●●
●●
●
●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 32
●●●●●●●●●●●●●
●
●●●●●
●
●
●
●●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●●●●
●
●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 33
●●●●●●●●●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●●●●
●●
●●●●●
●
●
●
●●●●●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 34
●●●●●●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●●●
●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 35
●●●●●●●●●●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●●
●●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 36
●●●●●●●●●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●●
●●
●
●
●●●●
●●
●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 37
●●●●●●●●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●●
●●●
●
●●
●●
●●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 38
●●●●●●●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 39
●●●●●●●●●
●
●●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●●
●●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 40
●●●●●●●●
●
●●
●
●●●
●
●
●●●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●●●
●●
●
●●●●
●
●●
●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 1
●●●●●●●●●
●
●●
●
●●●●
●
●●●
●
●
●●●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●●
●
●●●
●
●●●
●
●●
●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 2
●●●●●●●●●●●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●●●●●●
●
●
●●
●
●●●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●●●●●
●●
●●
●
●
●
●●●●●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 3
●●●●●●●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●●●
●
●
●●
●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 4
●●●●●●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 5
●●●●●●●●●
●
●●
●
●
●●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●●
●●
●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 6
●●●●●●●
●
●●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●●●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 7
●●●●●●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●●●●
●●
●●
●●●
●
●●
●
●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 8
●●●●●●●●●●●●
●
●●●●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●●●●●
●●●●●
●
●●●
●●
●
●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 9
●●●●●●●●●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●
●●●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 10
●●●●●●●●●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●●●●
●●●●
●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 21
●●●●●●●●●
●
●
●●●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●●
●
●
●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 22
●●●●●●●●●●●●
●
●●●
●
●
●●●●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●●●
●●●
●
●●●●●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●●●●
●●
●●
●
●
●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 23
●●●●●●●
●
●●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●●
●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 24
●●●●●●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●
●●●
●
●●
●
●●●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 25
●●●●●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●●●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●●●●
●
●●
●●
●
●●
●●●
●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 26
●●●●●●●●●●●●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●●●●
●●●
●
●●
●●
●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 27
●●●●●●●●
●
●
●●●●●●
●
●●●●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●●
●
●●●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●●
●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 28
●●●●●●●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 29
●●●●●●●●●
●
●●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●●
●●●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 30
●●●●●●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●●●
●●●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
choice
0 50 100 150
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 1
●●●●●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●●
●
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
choice
0 50 100 150
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 3
●●●●●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
0 50 100 150
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 5
●●●●●●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●●●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●●●●●
●
●●●
●
●
●●●●●
●●●
●●●
●●●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
0 50 100 150
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 7
●●●●●●●●
●
●
●●
●
●●●●
●
●●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●●●
●●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●●●●●
●●
●
0 50 100 150
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 9
●●●●●●●●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●●●
●
●
●●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●●●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
0 50 100 150
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 11
●●●●●●●●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●●
●●●
●●●
●●●
●●
0 50 100 150
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 13
●●●●●●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●●●
●●
●●
●●
●●
0 50 100 150
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 15
●●●●●●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●●●●●
●
●●●●●●●
●
●●●●●●●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
0 50 100 150
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 17
●●●●●●●
●●
●
●●●●●●●●●●●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●
0 50 100 150
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 19
●●●●●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
0 50 100 150
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 2
●●●●●●●●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
0 50 100 150
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 4
●●●●●●●●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●●
●●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●●
●●
●●
●●
●
●●
0 50 100 150
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 6
●●●●●●●●
●
●
●●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
0 50 100 150
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 8
●●●●●●●●●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●●●●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●●
●
●●
●●●●●●●
●
●●●●
●●
●
●●
●
●●●
●
●
●
0 50 100 150
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 10
●●●●●●●●●●●●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●●
0 50 100 150
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 12
●●●●●●●●●●●
●
●●●
●
●●
●
●●●●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●●
●
●●●●
0 50 100 150
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 14
●●●●●●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●●
●
●
●
●●
●●●●●●●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●●●●●
●
●●
●
0 50 100 150
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 16
●●●●●●●
●
●●
●
●●●●●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●●●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●●●
●●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
0 50 100 150
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 18
●●●●●●●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●●●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●●
●●
●
●
●●●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●●●
●
●
●
●●
●●●
0 50 100 150
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
trial
p(
bo
un
de
d 
op
tim
al)
participant 20
●●●●●●●●●●●●●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●●
●
●●
●●
●
●●
●
●●●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●●●●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●
●
●
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
choice
